The Long War


By Michael Yon

The Iraq War is over.

Flames still burst from various sources and wild cards remain, such as the potential that Muqtada al-Sadr might stomp his feet and encourage his diminished militias to attack us. Yet support for Sadr among Shia is hardly monolithic. In fact, many Shia view him as a simpleton whose influence derives strictly from respect for his father. Others cite the threat from Iran, but the Iranian participation in the fighting here remains overstated.

Nobody knows what the future will bring, but the civil war has completely ended.

The Iraqi army and police grow stronger by the month, and even the National Police (NP) are gaining a degree of respect and credibility.

As recently as last year, the NPs were considered nothing more than militia members in uniform who murdered with impunity. To go on patrol with NPs was to invite attack. But the Americans worked to help alleviate the disdain.

On one occasion, US soldiers peacefully disarmed a local militia that was apparently about to ambush NPs who had harassed it the same morning, and the soldiers sent the NPs to their station and later gave the locals back their guns. The next day, we were at the NP station as the US commander, Lt-Col. James Crider, gave professional instruction to the NP commanders.

Over time, the extremely frustrating process of mentoring the NPs worked. Last week, I went on foot patrol with US forces and NPs in the same Baghdad neighborhood. Kids were coming up to say hello. And the same people who used to tell me they hated the NPs were actually greeting them.

Similar dynamics have occurred in places like Anbar, Diyala and Nineveh. Tour after tour of US soldiers carried the ball successively, further down the field.

Through time, trust and bonds have been built between the US and Iraqi soldiers, police and citizens. The United States has a new ally in Iraq. And if both sides continue to nurture this bond, it will create a permanent partnership of mutual benefit.

Surely, one could pick up a brush and approach a blank canvas using colors from the palette of truth, and, with a cursory glance, smear Iraq to look like a Third World swamp. But Iraq is a complicated tapestry with great depth and subtle beauty. This land and its people have great potential to become a regional learning center of monumental importance.

Iraqis are tired of war and ready to get back to school, to business and to living life as it should be.

Last week, I shed my helmet and body armor and walked in south Baghdad as evening fell. The US soldiers who took me along were from the battle-hardened 10th Mountain Division; about half the platoon were combat veterans from Afghanistan and/or Iraq. Though most were in their 20s, they seemed like older men. None had even fired a weapon during this entire tour, which so far has lasted more than eight months, in what previously was one of the most dangerous areas of Iraq.

Americans and Iraqis had, in those earlier times, been killed or injured on the very streets we patrolled that day. Patched bullet holes pocked nearly every structure as if concrete-eating termites had infested, and there was resonance of car bombs once detonated on these avenues.

Now, the SOI (Sons of Iraq; what pessimists used to scathingly call "America’s Militias") are monitoring checkpoints. I talked with an SOI boss and found that he was getting along side-by-side with the neighborhood NP commander, and in fact they were laughing together. Those who derisively called the SOI "America’s Militias" have lost much credibility, while the commanders who supported the movement have earned that same credibility.

Though we are still losing American soldiers in Iraq, the casualties are roughly a tenth of previous highs. Attacks in general are down to about the same.

I asked some Iraqis, "Why are the terrorists attacking mostly Iraqis instead of Americans?" One man explained that the terrorists see the Iraqi army getting stronger and unifying with police, and the terrorists fear the Iraqi government.

Focusing on a few "Iraqi trees," one could make the argument that the war is ongoing and perilous. But to step back and look at "the forest," one cannot escape the fact that Iraq’s long winter is over, and the branches are budding.

Iraqis and Americans aren’t natural enemies. We have no reason to fight each other, and we understand each other far better than we did back in 2003. True bonds have been formed. Iraq and America realize that we have every reason to cooperate as allies.

But the greater, much more important, milestone will be the day when American, British and Polish students are studying in Iraq, while Iraqi students are studying in our countries. Cementing these ties takes time and patience. But we can do it.

By

MOSUL, IRAQ: Kiowa scout helicopters buzzed over the column of American and Iraqi troops, as they often do here in Mosul, hoping to deter insurgents from attacking. Iraqis in the blue camouflage of the National Police walked at the head of the column, while Americans kept to the center and rear, hovering protectively around the senior officer they were escorting.

Major General Mark Hertling, the commander of American forces in northern Iraq, had just walked about three miles through the heart of western Mosul, accompanied by a small detachment of soldiers and the commander of the unit responsible for the area, the 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Headquartered in Tikrit, Hertling’s 1st Armored Division keeps a forward element in Mosul under Brigadier General Raymond Thomas. But Hertling himself comes to the city, the most violent not only in his sector but across Iraq, often.

Three times during the patrol, gunshots rang out from somewhere off to the right, and when a crowd of locals engulfed the general, who commands the 1st Armored Division, the soldiers responsible for his security became antsy. But the general’s tour of the sector – a “battlefield circulation,” in military jargon – went off without a hitch.

At one point, the 3rd Squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Keith Barclay, stopped the patrol across the street from the ruins of a building demolished by a car bomb to buy lunch at a falafel stand. Later, speaking to a cluster of teenagers who had just finished school for the day, Hertling even removed his helmet – for a few seconds.

A few months ago, the idea that any American, let alone a division commander, could walk from Combat Outpost Rabi all the way to the Tigris without incident would have been unthinkable. The area contains some of western Mosul’s worst neighborhoods, places where insurgents still attack American and Iraqi troops with grenades, small arms, and car bombs.

As the Tigris bridge came into view, marking the end of the walk, soldiers from the cavalry squadron and the general’s detail seemed both excited and relieved. “We call it the Mosul 5K,” the captain who acts as Hertling’s aide-de-camp joked. Barclay was pleased as well. “We haven’t taken very many people on that long of a route dismounted,” he observed proudly.

Across the Tigris in eastern Mosul, Hertling joined Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Johnson, the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, which has been fighting here since January. Accompanied by armored MRAP troop transports and Bradley fighting vehicles, the general and the colonel walked down one street, meeting with two Iraqi battalion commanders while American troops leapfrogged ahead to secure intersections and angles from which insurgents could fire.

One Iraqi officer Hertling spoke to, the commander of the 3rd Iraqi Army Division’s 3rd Battalion, 9th Brigade, told the American general that while his troops had made strides in the security arena, other areas were lacking. Gesturing at the ruins of a house destroyed months ago by an insurgent car bomb, the battalion commander asked rhetorically, “Is this what they call reconstruction?”

At the Iraqi outpost that Hertling visited next, another Iraqi officer made the same point. Describing a recent patrol in southeastern Mosul, the officer, Brigadier General Baha described good security conditions but poor trash collection and sewage management. “We were walking in dirty water up to here,” he said. “So here is the security, but where is the government?”

Hertling responded sympathetically. “The security situation has gotten better several times,” he acknowledged, “but the government and the economy, they have not grown.”

And security, the general said, has a long ways to go as well: “In terms of police, we are far behind the rest of the north here. Two-thirds of the police in Mosul have not been trained properly. Ninewa is probably eight months behind Diyala in terms of police.”

Baha, who commands the 1st Iraqi Army Division’s 3rd Brigade, had his own ideas about the problems facing Mosul, and he was not shy about telling them to Hertling.

The Kurdish-dominated units of the 2nd Iraqi Army Division had been making the situation in Mosul worse, General Baha suggested, acting like foreign occupiers. “They do not speak Arabic well, and people are not sure about their loyalty,” he said. “They are part of the problem, a big part of the problem.”

“The people here say to me that the Iraqi Army is like a light bulb that was flickering, flickering, flickering, and finally it shines,” he continued, playing up the role of his own brigade, which arrived in Mosul from central Iraq this fall.

General Hertling was not pleased. “You need to be careful about suggesting that Mosul started to get better just because your brigade came here,” he admonished Baha. “It’s taken a long time, and a lot of work by many different Iraqi units.” As for the general’s allegations about the 2nd Division, Hertling was dismissive. “We’ve heard the rumors,” he said, “and unless you can come to me with names and dates of incidents, we’re not interested.”

Undeterred, Baha continued to critique the 2nd Division units serving in Mosul. When he referred to some Kurdish-dominated units as simply “Peshmerga,” as many locals in Mosul do, Hertling corrected him sharply. “They may have been Peshmerga in the past, but they are not Peshmerga now. They are Iraqi Army.”

Equipped with M16 rifles and other American gear not often seen in Mosul, the soldiers of Baha’s Sunni Arab-dominated brigade have a reputation, both here and across Iraq. For much of the past year, they have served as the “quick-reaction force” of the Iraqi military, deploying from their home in Anbar to hotspots in Basra, Sadr City, Diyala, and now Ninewa.

“They’re like the Ranger Regiment of the Iraqi Army,” an officer with 3rd Squadron said. “They’re great at kicking in doors and taking down the enemy, but they don’t like to do outposting, and they’re not really into talking to people.”

By

US forces have stepped up operations against the Iranian-backed Shia terror groups operating in Baghdad after a relative lull in November. Fourteen operatives from the League of the Righteous and the Hezbollah Brigades were captured in Baghdad during raids today.

Coalition forces - likely the hunter-killer teams from Task Force 88 - captured eight members of the League of the Righteous (Asaib Ahl al Haq) during two operations in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah and New Baghdad districts early Sunday morning. Six Hezbollah Brigades operatives were captured during two operations inside Adhamiyah.

Raids targeting the two Iranian-backed terror groups have been infrequent during the month of November. Only two other Hezbollah Brigades fighters were captured during a Nov. 11 operation in Baghdad. Twenty-eight Hezbollah Brigades operatives were captured during multiple raids in October.

The League of the Righteous is splinter groups that broke away from Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army after Sadr announced he would disband the Mahdi Army and form a small, secretive military arm to fight Coalition forces in June. Sadr’s moves caused shockwaves in the Mahdi Army, as some of the militia’s leaders wished to continue the fight against US forces in Baghdad and in southern and central Iraq.

The League of the Righteous receives funding, training, weapons, and direction from Iran’s Qods Force, the country’s secretive special operations group that backs terror groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah. The League of the Righteous conducts attacks with the deadly, armor-piercing explosively formed projectiles, or EFPs, as well as the more conventional roads bombs.

The size of the League of the Righteous is unknown, but hundreds of members of the group were killed, captured, or fled to Iran during the Iraqi government offensive against the Mahdi Army from March to July of this year, according to the US military.

Sadr is looking to pull the rank and file of the League back into the fold of the Sadr’s political movement. In a recent message issued by Sadr where he rejected the US-Iraqi security agreement, he said he "extends his hand to the mujahideen in the so-called Asaib but not their leaderships who have been distracted by politics and mortal life from the [two late] Sadrs and the interests of Iraq and Iraqis."

The Hezbollah Brigades or the Kata’ib Hezbollah, has been active for more than a year and has increased its profile by conducting attacks against US and Iraqi forces using the deadly explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, and improvised rocket-assisted mortars, which have been described as flying improvised explosive devices. The Hezbollah Brigades has posted videos of these attacks on the Internet.

The terror group is an offshoot of Iranian-trained Special Groups, the US military said last summer. Hezbollah Brigades receives funding, training, logistics, guidance, and material support from Iran’s Qods Force.

Suspected Qods Force officer released

Iraqi and US forces have detained several Qods Forces officers operating in southern and central Iraq over the past month. Iraqi and US forces have killed one Qods Force operative and captured 11 since mid-October.

On Nov. 18, US forces detained a suspected Qods Force commander as he attempted to leave Iraq via Baghdad International Airport. The US military said the Qods officer used a construction company as a front for his activates.

The Iranian, whose name is Nader Qorbani, was released on the request of the Iraqi government. "We called them and asked them to release him and we can confirm that the arrest was unlawful," Deputy Foreign Minister Labeed Abbawi told Reuters. "He’s working here on a contract and he’s been working here for some time."

The US military did not comment on the detention, and referred inquiries to the Iraqi government. "Coalition Forces have long recognized Iraq’s sovereignty in making decisions concerning their own legal affairs," a US military spokesman told the news agency.

Background on Iran’s backing of the Shia terror groups

Qods Force has supported various Shia militias and terror groups inside Iraq, including the Mahdi Army, helping to build them along the same lines as Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran denies the charges, but captive Shia terrorists admit to being recruited by Iranian agents and then transported into Iran for training.

Iran established the Ramazan Corps immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime to direct operations inside Iraq. The US military says Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have helped establish, fund, train, and arm, and have provided operational support for Shia terror groups such as the Hezbollah Brigades and the League of the Righteous. The US military refers to these groups as well as the Iranian-backed elements of the Mahdi Army as the "Special Groups." These groups train in camps inside Iran.

US and Iraqi forces have captured several high-level Qods Force officers inside Iraq since late 2006. Among those captured are Mahmud Farhadi, one of the three Iranian regional commanders in the Ramazan Corps; Ali Mussa Daqduq, a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative; Qais Qazali, the leader of the Qazali Network; and Azhar al Dulaimi, one of Qazali’s senior tactical commanders. The US has imposed sanctions on Major General Ahmad Foruzandeh, the former Qods Force commander, and Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander in Iran’s Qods Force, for backing Shia terror groups inside Iraq.

US military officers believe Iran is ramping up its operations inside Iraq after its surrogates suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Iraqi military during the spring and summer of 2008. Iraqi troops went on the offensive against the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed terror groups in Baghdad and central and southern Iraq. More than 2,000 Mahdi Army members were killed and thousands more were wounded. The operation forced Muqtada al Sadr to agree to a cease-fire and disband the Mahdi Army.

For more information on Iran’s involvement in supporting Shia terror groups in Iraq, see:

Iranian Qods Force Agents Detained in Irbil Raid
Jan. 14, 2007
The Karbala attack and the IRGC
Jan. 26, 2007
Iran, Hezbollah train Iraqi Shia "Secret Cells"
July 2, 2007
Surging in Wasit Province
Sept. 18, 2007
Captured Iranian Qods Force officer a regional commander in Iraq
Oct. 3, 2007
Iran’s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq
Dec. 5, 2007
Sadr forms new unit to attack US forces
June 13, 2008
Sadrist movement withdraws from political process
June 15, 2008
Mahdi Army decimated during recent fighting
June 26, 2008
Iraqi forces detain Sadrist leaders, uncover Special Groups headquarters in Amarah
July 2, 2008
Iraqi forces detain Sadrist leaders, uncover Special Groups headquarters in Amarah
July 2, 2008
Iran continues to train Shia terror groups for attacks in Iraq
Aug. 15, 2008
New Special Groups splinter emerges on Iraqi scene
Aug. 20, 2008
Iraqi troops find EFP factory in Sadr City
Oct. 30, 2008

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