Dick-Taters


Chávez does not speak for the South American left

By Jaime Daremblum

Hugo Chávez has been busy lately. On July 22, the Venezuelan president arrived in Moscow to finalize a number of bilateral energy and military agreements, including several arms deals that (according to a Russian newspaper) are reportedly worth around $2 billion. (His previous weapons acquisitions from Russia total some $4.5 billion.) On July 31, he announced plans to nationalize the Spanish-owned Bank of Venezuela, his country’s third-largest bank. That same day–the last day of an 18-month period during which he could exercise extraordinary powers granted by Congress–Chávez enacted 26 new laws that expanded considerably his control over the economy, the armed forces, and national elections. A few days later, on August 3, he vowed to "accelerate the socialist revolution" after Venezuela’s November elections.

Even though he has been embarrassed repeatedly over the past year, Chávez remains brazen and blustery. Flush with oil wealth, he continues to project a powerful image. But in reality, Chávez is rapidly losing influence in Latin America, and he has been for some time now.

In a recent New York Times piece, Simon Romero and Alexei Barrionuevo noted that Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva "is discreetly outflanking Mr. Chávez at almost every turn in the struggle for leadership in South America." Indeed, "Venezuela’s most pervasive influence remains limited to a handful of the region’s poorest nations–Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, and Nicaragua–members of ALBA, a trade alliance championed by Mr. Chávez. Another Chávez ally, Ecuador, is not a member." (The list of Venezuelan client states should also include Argentina. Chávez has close ties to Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, the former and current president of Argentina, respectively, and the Venezuelan regime has invested billions of dollars in Argentine bonds.)

Whereas Chávez has championed radical anti-capitalist policies and sought to move Venezuela backward, Lula has proved to be a pragmatic, market-friendly modernizer. It is the Lula model that has far greater appeal throughout the region.

After all, what has Chávez really done for Venezuela? Although the full extent of his mismanagement has been camouflaged by high energy prices (which have been a boon to the oil-rich country), he is wrecking the Venezuelan economy. The healthcare system has deteriorated alarmingly, and food shortages remain a persistent problem. Corruption is widespread, and rampant crime has earned Caracas its reputation as the most dangerous city in the Western Hemisphere.

Meanwhile, Chávez has eroded Venezuelan democracy and sought to create an authoritarian governing structure. Last December, his thinly veiled power grab–a proposal to amend the Venezuelan constitution–was rejected by voters in a national referendum. However, the 26 laws he decreed hurriedly on July 31 introduced many of the measures rejected in that referendum. Chávez has also barred certain opposition candidates from competing in the November elections. In the past week, such antidemocratic behavior has sparked street protests in Caracas.

With his "Bolivarian" revolution discredited both at home and abroad, Chávez’s desperate hope is that militaristic nationalism will strike a chord. He claims, absurdly, that he is preparing for a U.S. invasion. In fact, his military buildup is intended to consolidate his power and intimidate his neighbors. Chávez also wants to curry favor with the Venezuelan armed forces. (Remember, he was very nearly deposed by a military coup in 2002.)

How should the United States respond? What we should not do is engage the Venezuelan populist in a war of words. Instead, we should take practical steps to strengthen relations with Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and other South American democracies. It is utterly shameful that Democratic House leaders have refused to schedule a vote on the U.S.-Colombia free trade deal. How can we treat Colombia so poorly and expect other countries to view us as a credible partner? If U.S. lawmakers understood how their rebuke of Colombia was hurting America’s image in the region, one hopes they would reconsider and approve the trade pact immediately. Beyond Colombia, Washington must stay engaged on a range of trade, energy, social, and security issues that affect South America. We must remember that, broadly speaking, the region is moving in a positive direction: Economic growth rates have been strong, living conditions have improved, and democratic institutions have been bolstered.

Have many countries elected candidates of the left? Sure. But it should be clear by now that Chávez does not speak for the South American left. In 2003, a center-left Chilean government signed a free trade agreement with the United States. In Brazil, the center-left Lula government has pursued a sound, market-oriented economic agenda and worked with the Bush administration to promote ethanol production. Peru’s center-left president, Alan García, has embraced market reforms and free trade. In early 2007, the United States and Uruguay signed a "Trade and Investment Framework Agreement." Uruguay, too, has a center-left government, led by President Tabaré Vázquez. In other words, Chávez is losing the ideological battle, and we should not inflate his stature or the extent of his influence. Thanks to computer files recovered earlier this year by the Colombian military, we have learned more about Venezuelan support for the narco-terrorists of the FARC. These revelations have further damaged Chávez’s standing in the region. Now is the time for Washington to boost its own standing in Latin America and deepen cooperation with its democratic partners.

Jaime Daremblum, former ambassador of Costa Rica to the United States (1998-2004), is director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the Hudson Institute.

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 By Gustavo Coronel

The mood that permeates Venezuela today is one that seems to signal impending doom for autocratic Hugo Chavez. The lyrics of Paul Anka’s “My Way” seem to float in the Caracas air: “And now, the end is near… ”.

Three moves by Chavez, all taken during the last month, comprise his attempt to maintain control over an increasingly frustrated country. The first one is the passing, on the very last day of the period of legislative power granted to him by the National Assembly, of 26 decree-laws that will give him most of the powers that he tried to get, unsuccessfully, through the December 2007 Constitutional referendum.

Defeated by the voters in the referendum, he is now using this blunt force to obtain what the popular vote denied him. No one in the country, except those who drew up the over 2000 articles of the new decrees, knew about them in advance or had a chance to discuss them. In another major move, Chavez used his General Comptroller and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice to ban 260 Venezuelans from running for office in the November regional elections. Not surprisingly, several of the best candidates of the opposition, favored to win by all polls, are included in the ban, which openly violates articles 42 and 65 of the current Venezuelan Constitution.

The third move has been his takeover of Banco de Venezuela, the third largest private bank in the country, owned by Spanish Bank of Santander. Chavez characteristically announced this move during one of his TV shows, without any notice made to the owners. Chavez had been in Spain only days before, trying to mend his relationship with the King, but did not disclose his intentions.

Although these moves would seem to indicate overwhelming power and complete political control of the country, a more careful reading suggests them to be attempts at asserting authority by a weakening leader facing increasing opposition from Venezuelan civil society. The ban on opposition leaders is being challenged in the streets, giving rise to popular protests in which the students are once more leading the way. A delegation of MERCOSUR, the free trade organization from the southern cone, has visited Caracas to investigate the ban and finds it undemocratic, which will prevent Chavez from joining the organization.

Public opinion in the U.S. and Europe is beginning to see Mr. Chavez’s tactics in the same category with Zimbabwe’s Mugabe. The reaction against the decree-laws is starting to unfold and could develop into open civil rebellion.

One of the new decrees would give Chavez the rank of four-star general, not currently existing, and the pompous title of “Generalissimo” in the same level with dictators like Tito, Franco, and Chiang Kai-Sheck. Another decree will convert the state-owned petroleum company, PDVSA, into an agricultural and industrial conglomerate, and still a third would create a new army, loyal to Chavez and not to the nation.

Leaders of the opposition, including industrialist Rafael Alfonzo and recent Milton Friedman award winner and student leader Jon Goicochea, are calling for a popular rebellion, including, if need be, a general strike against the Chavez regime, while members of his own political coalition are speaking in open disagreement with the measures. The takeover of Banco de Venezuela has pushed the country risk of Venezuela to record highs, now 679 points — highest in the hemisphere. The fear of private investors is turning into terror as some of the decrees, especially one on “food sovereignty,” could justify the takeover of important privately-owned food companies.

Once again, Hugo Chavez has brought Venezuela to the brink of open social conflict. He now seems determined to become an absolute ruler. He is forcing a showdown with the Venezuelan people that he has little chance of winning, given the mood of the country. This time he cannnot expect much solidarity from his allies in the hemisphere since Morales, Kirchner, Ortega, and the Castro dynasty are experiencing similar — if not even worse — problems. As the Venezuelan private sector, the Catholic church, the student movement, the opposition parties, civil society in general and many of the members of his own political coalition take the media and the streets against him, Chavez will be fighting for his political life, weighed down by the burden of ridicule and possibly facing the final curtain. He could probably claim he did it “his way,” but history will say that his way was not the people’s way.

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